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1.

INTRODUCTION

Respondent Ulysses Mori cannot escape the central point of T.J.T., Inc.'s ("TJT")
appeal from the district court's grant of summaryjudgment: the district court pre-tried TJT's
claims at the summary judgment stage to conclude that the Non-Competition Agreement was
unenforceable. Critical to the district court's conclusion was its factual determination that the
business of Leg-it Tire Company, Inc. ("Leg-it") was "exclusively limited" to Northern
California. ER 000232 (1/31/08 Order). Under California law, the location in which Leg-it
conducted any phase of its business is also the location in which the non-compete at issue can be
enforced. On the record before the district court and on appeal, the location in which Leg-it
conducted any phase of its business is a hotly contested issue for which many issues of material
fact exist. Indeed, on appeal, Mori ignores his own live testimony offered to the district court
during the preliminary injunction hearing wherein he stated that the business of Leg-it was
carried on in 11 Western states in 1997. See ER 000212-000213 (10/22/08 Tr. p. 26, L. 20 p. 30, L. 20); see also ER 000216. As a result, the district court did what decades of appellate
law warns against: it deprived a litigant of the right to a trial by weighing evidence and resolving
factual disputes by way of a summary judgment proceeding.
Mori would also like to portray himself as a victim and hope the Court will ignore
that he was handsomely paid $500,000.00 for the goodwill associated with the $1 million sale of
the business of Leg-it. Along the same line, Mori attempts to minimize his role at TJT after
consumn~atingthe Leg-it sale in 1997, but ignores that TJT-a

publicly traded company-also

gave Mori a seat on TJT's board of directors and Mori became responsible for day-to-day

management of the Woodland, California, facility as a senior vice president of TJT. ER 000007
(Verified Complaint 7 11); ER 000025 (Answer 112); ER 000048 (Deposition of Ulysses Mori
("Mori Depo.")), p. 47, L. 25 - p. 48, L. 5). Additionally, as TJT's President and CEO testified,
"Ulysses Mori went wherever he was needed. He was a temfic troubleshooter. He was very
busy all the time and he was - I miss him a lot." See ER SEROOO26 @eposition of Terrence J.
Sheldon, p. 49, LL. 18-20). These additional factual issues demonstrate that, when construed in
the light most favorable to TJT, the evidence in the record does not warrant the entry of summary
judgment. To the contrary, the record evidence presents a compelling case for the enforcement
of the Non-Competition Agreement against Mori.

11.

ARGUMENT

In his briefing on appeal, Mori liberally attacks the scope, breadth, and
enforceability of the Non-Competition Agreement and even accuses TJT of becoming "greedy"
in its effort to secure a non-compete ancillary to the sale of Leg-it. See Respondent's Brief at 1,
4,12, and 14. The Court. cannot overlook that Mori's law firm was on both sides of the
transaction and was the very firm that drafted the Non-Competition Agreement at issue. See
ER000223-225 (Letter from Howard Selignan to Paul Boyd). Now that TJT has different
representation, all of the sudden it has become "greedy" and, curiously, the Non-Competition
Ageement is worthless and unenforceable. Putting this aside, there can be no doubt that the
Non-Competition Agreement is enforceable under California law.

A.

The Non-Competition Agreement at Issue Is Governed by Business and
Professions Code Section 16601.
h'ot surprisingly, Mori tries to cast the Non-Competition Agreement at issue as

being governed by California Business and Professions Code Section 16600, which states
"Except asprovided in this chapter, every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging

in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent void." (Emphasis added.)
Although Mori argues that California public policy prohibits "employment" non-competition
agreements, Mori ignores that since before the Turn of the 20th Century, California courts have
also enforced non-compete provisions made ancillary to the sale of a business. See Franz v.
Bielev, 126 Cal. 176 (1899) (enforcing covenant under predecessor lo Section 16601); see also
Stephens v. Bean, 65 Cal. App. 779 (1924) (same); Mahlstedt v. Fugit, 79 Cal. App. 2d 562

(1947) (same). Accordingly, the public policy in favor of allowing a party to enforce a covenant
not to compete made ancillary to the sale of a business is equally as strong.
Mori makes note that covenants not to compete under Section 16601 are the
exception, but that does not mean that such covenants are to be interpreted narrowly. In fact,
under California law, "Covenants arising out of the sale of a business are more liberally
enforced than those arising out of the employer-employee relationship." Monogram Indus., Inc.

v. SAR Indus., Inc., 64 Cal. App. 3d 692, 697, 134 Cal. Rptr. 714 (1976) (emphasis added).
Moreover, under California law dating back to 1872, "[a]lI contracts, whether public or private,
are to be interpreted by the same rules, except as otherwise provided by this Code." CAL.CIV.

CODE5 1635 (emphasis added). To interpret the Non-Competition Agreement any differently

would be inconsistent with California's long-standing public policy of fostering freedom of
contract and of interpreting agreements in a manner that will make them enforceable, rather than,
as against public policy. See CAL.Crv. CODE$ 1643 ("A contract must receive such an
interpretation as will make it lawful, operative, definite, reasonable, and capable of being carried
into effect, if it can he done without violating the intention of the parties."); see also Nw. Mut.
Five Ass'n v. Pac. WharfStorage Co., 187 Cal. 38,44 (1921) ("[Ilf there is one thing more than

another which public policy requires, it is that men of full age and competent understanding shall
have the utmost liberty of contxact, and that every contract, when entered into fairly and
voluntarily, shall be . . . enforced by the courts of justice."). In fact, the Monogram court
suggests that the covenant at issue here should be given more liberal enforcement given the
amount paid to Mori for the goodwill of his former company.
B.

Genuine Issues of Material Fact Exist as to the Location in Which Leg-it
Conducted Business.
When it came time to offer Leg-it for sale in 1997, Mori demanded $1 million,

even though its book value barely exceeded $500,000. See ER 000074-000075 (1997 Leg-it
Balance Sheet); ER 000045 (Mori Depo., p. 35, LL. 6-9); ER 000046 (Mori Depo., p. 38, L. 12 p. 39, L. 3); ER 000079 (Merger Agreement 7 2.1 at 4). Today, Mori takes a much different
approach toclaim that he was once touted as a tire and axle empire is now a lowly business with
a small operation in Northern California. The record does not support Mori's newfound, but
inconsistent claim. What Mori does not tell this Court is that he admitted in proceedings before
the dishict court that, at the time of the merger in 1997, Leg-it did, in fact, also do business in

Oregon, Washington, Nevada, Idaho, Montana, Nebraska, Arizona, and Texas. See ER 000025
(Defendant Mori's Answer, 7 9). Additionally, during his deposition, Mori confirmed this
admission in his answer. See ER 000043 (Mori Depo., p. 27, L. 1 - p. 28, L. 14). Mori also
admitted in his deposition that the purchase of raw tires and axles in the above-identified states
constituted at least 50% of Leg-it's business in 1997 and that the purchase of raw tires and axles
is only one of the two components of the recycling business. See ER 000043 (id.,p. 24, L.22 -

During his deposition, Mori also adrnitted that he was competing with TJT &
markets in which Leg-it operated in 1997:
Q. You do admit that today you are competing with TJT; is that
correct?
A. l a m doing salesfor West States Recycling.
Q. Are you doing that in competition to TJT?
A. West States Recycling is in competition with TJT.

Q. (BY MR. WARD) Youplan on continuing to compete in
northern Califoria, Zpresume; correct?
A. As long as the company directs me that way.
Q. You have contacted factories that are present customers of
TJT in Idaho, Washington, and Oregon; correct?
A. And others, correct.

See ER 000061 (id.,p. 99, LL. 3-10; p. 100, LL. 13-17) (emphasis added).
Against the weight of these repeated admissions, there is no support in the
appellate record for Mori's attempts to create the false impression that Leg-it only did business
in Northern California. The "business" must be taken as a whole and both aspects of the

"business" must be considered. Likewise, there is no weight to Mori's claim that the NonCompete Agreement can be enforced only in Northern California because the clear record
evidence demonstrates that Leg-it operated in numerous states and not just exclusively in
Northern California. As demonstrated in TJT's opening brief, the place where Leg-it "mostly"
conducted business is not the standard; rather, the question is whether Leg-it carried on some
of its business in other states. Mori has not cited any case to this Court that suggests the
enforceability of a non-competition provision is governed by a "qualitative" analysis that
measures the extent to which business was carried on in a specific location. Accord Monogram

Indus., Inc. v. SAR Indus., Inc., 64 Cal. App. 3d 692,702, 134 Cal. Rptr. 714 (1976) (stating that
non-competition provisions are enforceable tenitones where the sold business conducted any
phase of its business and enforcing non-competition provision in the United States, Puerto Rico,
the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Canada).
Finally, Mori misleadingly cites Kaplan v. Nalpak Gorp., 158 Cal. App. 2d 197,
332 P.2d 226 (Cal. App. 1958), as requiring that a "substantial amount" of business be
conducted. Mori is incorrect and misreads Kaplan. In Kaplan, the parties stivulated that a
"substantial amount" of the sold business was conducted in certain locations; however, the

Kaplan court never held that a prerequisite to enforceability to a non-compete is the existence of

a substantial amount of business. Id. at 199. To the contrary, the Kaplan court held that the
locations in which a "corporation's business 'has been carried on' within the meaning of section
16601 of the Business and Professions Code are not necessarilv limited to those in which it has
maintained plants, warehouses, stores or other physical structures." Id. at 200 (emphasis added).

As demonstrated below, the same holds true here, as the operations of Leg-it reached far beyond
its physical plant location in Northern California.
C.

Enforcement of the Non-Competition Agreement at Issue Is Not Limited to
Northern California.
Mori appears to contend that if the Non-Competition Agreement is enforceable at

all, it can only be enforced in Northern California because that is where Mori now says that
Leg-it conducted "most" of its business. To support this argument, Mori attempts to shift the
Court's focus away from the several states in which Leg-it actually conducted its business and
attempts to downplay the significance of Leg-it's business outside of the state of California.
Specifically, Mori states that "Leg-it had one facility, in Woodland, California, . . . and the
recycled tires and axles were sold to approximately four or five manufactured home factories in
Northern California and one factory in Colorado." See Respondent's Brief at 2. Mori also states
that Leg-it "occasionally" made connections outside of California to procure raw lirelaxles from
dealers out of state. Id.at 2-3.
Mori's uses the term "occasional" to imply that these contacts were de minimus,
notwithstanding his several admissions in the record that belie this assertion on appeal.
Although Mori states that Leg-it "occasionaIly" purchased raw tires and axles in states outside of
Northern California, he cannot credibly minimize the extent to which these contacts were
necessary to Leg-it's business.

Q. What was the area that you were covering by the time you sold
to TJT in your dealer sales?
A. It would basically fluctuate from time to time, but basically the
area was California, Reno, Nevada, Oregon, a little bit of

Washington, and over to - we actually got into Idaho and
Montana. That is where I would send my own trucks from time to
time.
Q. So you were operating irz all of those states acquiring raw
tires and axles?
A. Yes.

Q. But the acquisition of tire and axles was a huge component of
Leg-it's business; was it not?
A. Primarv.

See ER 000043 (Mori Depo., p. 27, L. I - p. 28, L. 14 (emphasis added)). Mori also admitted in
his deposition that the purchase of raw tires and axles in the above-identified states constituted at
least 50% of Leg-it's business in 1997 and that the purchase of raw tires and axles is one of the
only two components of the recycling business. See ER 000043 (id., p. 24, L. 22 -- p. 25, L. 2;
p. 28, L. 15 - p. 29, L. 6). Indeed, Mori admits in his respondent's brief that Leg-it's operations
in Northern California facility were small, which further supports the significance of the extent
to which Leg-it conducted business in other states because the purchase of raw tires and axles in
these states was extremely important to Leg-it's business. Simply put, if Leg-it did not have any
products to recycle, it would therefore not have any products to sell. In other words, this other
key aspect of Leg-it's business admittedly carried on outside of Northern California was
significant.

In light of the record evidence, there can be no doubt that Leg-it conducted
busi~iessoutside of the state of California, and specifically in Idaho, Oregon, and Washington,
i.e., the very areas in which TJT seeks to enforce the Non-Competition Agreement. In

circumstances where a sold business conducted business in several locations, the California
Court of Appeal has previously addressed the appropriate reach of a non-competition provision,
stating:
We hold that in the provisions of Business and Professions Code
section 16601 the area where a business is "carried on" is not
limited to the locations of its buildings,plants and warehouses,
nor the area in which it actually made sales. The territorial limits
are coextensive with the entire area irz which the parties
conducted all phases o f their business including vroduction,
promotional and marketinn activities as well as sales.
Monogram, 64 Cal. App. 3d at 702 (emphasis added). As a result. the Monogram court enforced
the non-competition provision in the United States, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and
Canada, where the seller conducted business on a nationwide scale. Id. Although Mori would
like the "conducting business" test to be limited to the place fram which sales are made to its
customers, the Monogram court makes clear that numerous other activities count for purposes of
conducting business. The Court can easily do the same as it relates to the vast amount of
business that Leg-it conducted outside of Califomia.
And, Mori's inapposite analogies to pizza parlors, grocery stores, and other
irrelevant lines of business offer no help in analyzing the issues before the Court. The businesses
at issue in this case deal with a single commodity: tires and axles. Mori agrees that Leg-it

needed to buy raw tires and axies in order to have a product to sell and that this was a "huge
component" of Leg-it's business. See ER 000043 (Mori Depo., p. 28, LL. 11-14). Mori also
overlooks the fact that Leg-it employees actually traveled into several states outside of California
to procure the very same raw tires and axles that Leg-it ultimately sold to its customers. See ER

00043 (id., p. 27, L. 20 - p. 28, L. 4) ("That is where I would send my own trucks from time to
time."). Mori cannot ignore the essential elements of the tire and axle recycling business, nor
can he credibly claim that he did not conduct the business of Leg-it outside of California. To the
contrary, Mori has admitted that the "primary" aspects of the business of Leg-it took place in
several locations outside of Leg-it's recycling facility in Woodland, California.
Consistent with Monogram, the territorial limits in which the Non-Competition
Agreement can be enforced include the entire areas in which Leg-it conducted all phases of its
business including promotional and marketing activities as well as sales. The undisputed record
establishes that Leg-it "carried on'" significant phase of its business, i.e., the acquisition of raw
tires and axles, in several states, including Oregon, Washington, Nevada, Idaho, Montana,
Nebraska, Arizona, and Texas. Accordingly, the Non-Competition Agreement is enforceable in
each of these states.

D.

The Non-Competition Agreement at Issue Was Executed as Part of the
Merger Between Leg-it and TJT and Is Therefore Governed by
Section 16601.
Mori insinuates without directly stating that the Non-Competition Agreement

should be invalidated because is was supposedly tied to Mori's post-merger employment with
TJT. This argument ignores the nature and timing of the transaction between Leg-it and TJT, as
evidenced by the undisputed documents before this Court. Under the clear record presented in
this case, there can be no doubt that the Non-Competition Agreement is governed by
Section 16601, as the agreement was made ancillary to the merger between Leg-it and TJT. But
for the merger, there would have been no need for the covenant. Specifically, the plain language

of Section 4 states that Mori agreed not to compete with TJT "for the period beginning on the
Effective Date and ending two (2) years following [Mori's] termination of employment with

[TJT] . . . ." See ER 0001 13. The "Effective Date" of the Non-Competition Agreement is
June 24, 1997, i.e., the same date Mori and TJT executed the Agreement and Plan of Merger.
Compare ER 000111 @on-Competition Agreement) with ER000076 (Agreement and Plan of

Merger). Accordingly, the "term" of the Non-Competition Agreement is unquestionably tied to
the date of the merger between TJT and Leg-it. Indeed, as one would expect, the NonCompetition Agreement was executed the very same day as the Agreement and Plan of Merger
between Leg-it and TJT. See ER 0001 11; 00076.
In addition to the timing in which the Non-Competition Agreement was executed,
the terms of the agreement eviscerate Mori's contention that the Non-Competition Agreement
should be invalid because it simply uses Mori's employment as a trigger for when tlie non..,.,,.
compete goes into effect. Notablflhe-Nm-G~m~tion,A~e,~ent,st~tes:

.-"
,,,,.,"
.

Seller acknowledges that:
(c) JTJT1has required that Seller make the covenants set forth
in Sections 3 and 4 [noncompetition provision] hereof
condition of ITJT7slpurchase of the Stock [of Lee-itl;
(d) the provisions of Sections 3 and 4 [noncompetition provision]
are reasonable and necessary to protect and preserve the business
of Leg-it (as a division of [TJT]); and JTJTl and its Lee-it
Division would be irreparablv damaged if Seller were to
breach the covenants set forth in Sections 3 and 4
[noncompetitionprovision]; and
(e) the time, scope, geographic area and other provisions
hereof have been specificafly negotiated by sophisticated
business persons.

See ER 000112 (Non-Competition Agreement at 2) (bold emphasis added; italics in original).
Stated simply, as a condition of paying Mori nearly a halfa million dollars for the goodwill stock
of his business, TJT required as part of this merger that Mori execute this covenant. Moreover,
the non-competition provision at issue here states that Mori agreed to the non-compete as "an
inducement for [TJT] to enter into the Merger Agreement and as additional consideration for the
consideration to be paid to [Mori] under the Merger Agreement." EROOOI 13.
Now that Mori refuses to uphold his end of the Non-Competition Agreement, he
is looking for any way-whether

based in fact or not-to

avoid the clear enforceability of the

non-competition provision. As the Non-Competition Agreement unequivocally states, the noncompetition provision in Section 4 was a "condition of the purchase of Leg-it" and that the
specific terms of the non-competition provision were "specifically negotiated by sophisticated
business persons." This is not a relationship where there exists unequal bargaining power and
the parties so acknowledged. Mori was represented by counsel in negotiations involving the
Non-Competition Agreement. See ER000223-225. Mori received a half million dollars for the
goodwill of his business that he grew and operated throughout the West. Under California law, a
person cannot accept the benefits of a contract (accept a six-figure sum of money) and thereaaer
deny being bound by the contract (later seek to invalidate its provisions).' Mori cannot be
allowed to use the Non-Competition Agreement to whipsaw TJT in this fashion.

See, e.g., Avina v. Cigna Healthplans, 211 Cal. App. 3d 1, 3 (1989); Lemaf Corp. v. Am.
Basketball Assoc., 51 Cal. App. 3d 267,275-277 (1975).

Additionally, the sole fact that TJT also chose to employ Mori upon purchase of
his business does not change this result. Mori tries to ignore the true nature of the circumstances
under which the Non-Competition Agreement was executed by pointing to the Employment
Agreement also executed between Mori and TJT. In particular, Mori relies on a single provision
from the Employment Agreement-its

integration clause-which

states that the Employment

Agreement and the Non-Competition Agreement (defined as the "Employment Documents" in
the Employment Agreement) contain the entire understanding of the parties. See SER00008
(Employment Agreement fi 2.5). Mori contends that the integration clause of the Employment
Agreement somehow converts the true nature of the transaction, i.e., the merger and purchase of
Leg-it by TJT, to a single employer-employee non-competition agreement. Notably, the
Employment Agreement itself does not contain a non-competition agreement, and the integration
clause simply states that the Employment Agreement and the Non-Competition Agreement
executed on June 24, 1997, constitute the entire understanding between the parties. Importantly,
the integration clause does not say what Mori wishes it says and does not say that the terms of
the Non-Competition Agreement are incorporated by reference into the Employment Agreement

In any event, the reference to the Non-Competition Agreement in the Employment Agreement
does not change the hndamental nature of the merger transaction that was executed on June 24,
1997, by TJT and Mori.
To further illustrate the differences between and purposes of the Employment
Agreement and the Non-Competition Agreement, it is also important to note in what capacity
Mori signed each respective document. Specifically, Mori signed the Non-Competition

Agreement as "Seller" of Leg-it, whereas Mori signed the Employment Agreement as
"Employee" of TJT. See EROOOl18 (Non-Competition Agreement); SER00012 (Employment
Agreement). Mori's execution of the Non-Con~petitionAgreement as the "Seller" further
underscores the nature of the transaction and the circumstances under which Mori and TJT
entered into the Non-Competition Agreement. The covenant was a condition and ancillary to the
sale of this business under Section 16601. Against this background, Mori's attempts to cast the
Non-Competition Agreement as more akin to an employer-employee non-compete can be
summarily rejected.
E.

The Non-Competition Agreement at Issue Can Be Enforced Consistently
with Business and Professions Code Section 16601.

In another effort to void the Non-Competition Agreement, Mori argues that the
scope of the non-competition provision in Section 4 goes beyond what is allowable under
California law. Specifically, Mori contends that the Non-Competition Agreement is overly
broad because it does not prohibit Mori from competing in Northern California only. Mori
claims that, at most, the Non-Competition Agreement should be limited to Northern California
where Leg-it maintained a facility, and because the prohibited areas included other areas in
which TJT conducted business, Mori contends that the entire Non-Competition Agreement is
somehow unenforceable. Mori's arguments fail under California law. As demonstrated below,
the California courts have a long history of enforcing non-competition provisions by tailoring the
geographic areas to those in which the &conducted business.

In support of this argument that the Non-Competition Agreement is unenforceable
and cannot be tailored, Mori relies on Strategix, Ltd. v. Infocrossing West, Inc., 142 Cal. App.
4th 1068 (2006). A careful reading of the Strategix case does not support Mori's position. And,

Strategix is clearly distinguishable to the facts presented here. Moreover, a survey of California
law reveals that the Non-Competition Agreement remains enforceable even if, on its face, the
non-competition provision includes broad restrictions on territories in which Mori can compete.

1.

Mori misplaces his reliance on Straiegrj.

To understand the manner in which Mori has misapplied Strategiu, it is important
to study the specific nonsolicitation covenant at issue in that case. Quite simply, Strategix
involved the sale of a business by the seller, Strategix/ePassage,to a buyer, InfocrossingISMS.

Id. at 1071. The nonsolicitation covenants in Strategix prohibited the seller of the business from
soliciting the buyer's employees and customers. Id. The buyer of the business ultimately sued
the seller for violating the nonsolicitation of customers and sought injunctive relief. Id. The
district court granted a preliminary injunction baning the seller of the business from soliciting
the buyer's employees or customers. Id. at 1071-72. In reversing the district court, the
California Court of Appeal concluded that the "courts may enforce nonsolicitation covenants
barring the seller from soliciting the sold business's employees and customers." Id. at 1073
(emphasis in original). Because the covenant at issue in Strategin prohibited only the solicitation
of the buyer's customers and not the sold business 's employees and customers, the court of
appeals held the covenant invalid. Id. at 1073-74.

The purchaser in Stvategix requested the court of appeals to blue pencil the
nonsolicitation cove~iantsto address only the solicitation of the sold business's employees. Id. at

1074. The court of appeals refused to blue pencil the nonsolicitation covenants stating, "We
decline to rewrite overbroad covenants not to solicit Infocrossing's [the buyer's] employees and
customers into narrow bars against soliciting Strategix's [the sold business's] former employees
and customers." Id. Accordingly, the reason the Strategix court refused to blue pencil the
nonsolicitation covenants is because such covenants prohibited solicitation of only the buyer's
customers and employees and, therefore, the covenants could not be narrowed in scope to be
enforced against the seller's customers and employees. In short, the court of appeals simply
chose not to completely rewrite the nonsolicitation covenants to prohibit solicitation of a
completely new group of people, i.e., the sold business's employees and customers.
In support of his argument that the non-competition provision of Section 4 is
overly broad and cannot be blue penciled, Mori argues that the covenant at issue in Strategix
"purported to restrict the seller from soliciting the employees and customers of the entire buyer
business, not just the former employees and customers of the seller business." See Respondent's
Brief at 15 (emphasis omitted). However, a careful reading of Strategix reveals that the
nonsolicitation covenants did not cover the employees and customers being sold and instead
focused exclusively on solicitation of the buyer's employees and customer^.^ Indeed, the very

The California Court of Appeal described the covenants as follows:
The consulting agreement contained two nonsolicitation covenants.
One prohibited ePassage [seller] from soliciting SMS's [buyer's]

reason the court of appeals refused to blue pencil the nonsolicitation covenants is because such
covenants did not include the sold business's customers and employees and, therefore, the
covenants could not be "narrowed" in any fashion to be enforceable. As a result, the cot& of
appeals refused to rewrite the nonsolicitation covenant and prohibit solicitation of the sold
business's customers and employee^.^

employees for one year after the termination of the consulting
relationship. The other prohibited ePassage [seller] from
soliciting SMS's [buyer's] customers for the same period.

Id. at 142 Cal. App. 4th at 1071.
TOenforce the nonsolicitation provision in Strategix as requested by the buyer, the court
of appeals would have had to write in words, as opposed to merely striking words, thus violating
the blue pencil doctrine. Specifically, the provisions would be rewritten as follows:
Section 5.403) - Customer Nan-solicitation:
ePassage [seller] agrees that during the term of this Agreement and
for a period of twelve (12) months immediately following the
termination of epassage's relationship with the Company [buyer]
for any reason, whether with or without cause, ePassage [seller]
shall not, and shall cause its employees and agents not to, call on,
solicit or service any former customer, supplier, licensee, licensor,
consultant, or other trade related business relation of
ePassage in order to induce or attempt to induce such person or
entity to cease doing business with the Company, or in any way
interfere with the relationship between any such former ePassaee
customer, supplier, licensee, licensor, consultant or other trade
related business relation and the Company (including, without
limitation, making any disparaging statements or communications
about the Company).
See 2006 W L 886991 at * 5 (Respondent's Brief filed in Strategix, Ltd. v. Infocrossing West,
Inc., dated February 23,2006).

In comparison to the case at bar, the Non-Competition Agreement does not
prohibit Mori from competing in areas solely where TJT does business or prohibit Mori from
soliciting TJT's customers only. If it did, then the Strategix case might have some arguable
applicability. Instead, the Non-Competition Agreement prohibits Mori from competing in
territories where both TJT and Leg-it conducted business, as well as soliciting both TJT and
Leg-it's customers. Because the Non-Competition Agreement contains broad language
prohibiting competition in areas where both TJT and Leg-it carried on business, it can easily be
"narrowed" to allow enforcement where just Leg-it conducted business. The same holds true
with regard to the solicitation of Leg-it's customers. Thus, as demonstrated below, at the very
minimum, the Non-Competition Agreement is enforceable to the extent it prohibits Mori from
The district
competing and soliciting customers in areas where Leg-it "carried on" its busine~s.~

For example, the Non-Competition Agreement could be easily narrowed (as opposed to
rewritten) as follows:
4.

Noncompetition.

As an inducement for the Conlpany to enter into the Merger
Agreement and as additional consideration for the consideration to
be paid to Seller under the Merger Agreement:
For the period beginning on the Effective
(a)
Date and ending two (2) years following Seller's termination of
employment with the Company for any reason (such period being
the "Term"):
Seller shall not . . . engage or invest in, own,
(i)
manage, operate, finance, control, or participate in the ownership,
management, operation, financing, or control of, be employed by,
associated with, or in any manner connected with, lend Seller's
name or any similar name to, lend Seller's credit to, or render

court erred by refusing to address this question, as California law permits a covenant not to
compete to be "narrowed," so long as the covenant is not "rewritten."
2.

For over a century, California courts have narrowed broadly worded
non-competition provisions to allow enforcement in territories where
the sold business was "carried on."

A review of California law suggests that, had the nonsolicitation covenants in
Strategix covered the sold business's employees and customers and the buyer's employees and
customers, the court of appeals could have blue penciled the covenants to prohibit only the
solicitation of the sold business's customers and employees.
For example, California courts have long enforced overbroad non-compete
provisions to the extent that they were properly enforceable. In Franz v. Bieler, 126 Cal. 176
(1899), the California Supreme Court enforced, pursuant to Section 16601's predecessor, anon-

compete provision in which the defendant agreed he would not engage in the wine and liquor
business "within the radius of ten miles in either direction fi-om 809 East Fourteenth street, in the
city of Oakland, for the period of 10 years." Id. at 180. The defendant argued that the provision
was invalid, because the described area included three separate counties. The supreme court,
however, found that the exact territory being described was ascertainable, and the agreement was

services or advice to, any business whose products or activities
compete in whole or in part with the products or activities of %e
Leg-it, anywhere within 1000 miles of any
Leg-it; . . . .
facility owned or operated by

EROOOl13 (Non-Competition Agreement) (emphasis added).

enforceable to the extent the property fell within the county where the defendant conducted
business. The supreme court explained "that the inclusion of territory greater than that
sanctioned by the code is void only as to the excess." Id. at 181 (emphasis added).
Similarly, in Stephens v. Bean, 65 Cal. App. 779 (1924), the California Court of
Appeal enforced an agreement prohibiting an undertaker, who had sold his one-half interest in an
undertaking business, from forever competing with the purchaser, despite the lack of either a
geographical or temporal limitation in the agreement. The court of appeal concluded that the
business was local in nature and that the city and county in which it was located was apparent
from the agreement. The court of appeal further noted that the general prohibition against noncompete provisions (currently Section 16600) stated only that a contract not in accordance with
the provisions of that chapter "is to that extent void" and not wholly void. Id. Therefore, to the
extent that the agreement did comply with Section 16601's predecessor, it was valid and
enfor~eable.~

In Mahlstedt v. Fugit, 79 Cal. App. 2d 562 (1947), as in Stephens, the California
Court of Appeal enforced an agreement under Section 16601 that contained no geographical
limitation at all. In Maklsredt, the seller of a heater business agreed not to enter into that
business as a manufacturer, owner, or salesman for 10 years. The seller later argued that the
agreement was void, because it did not contain a geographical limit, as required by Section

' Moreover, as far back as 1934, the California Supreme Court expressed the policy in
California that courts should try to find ways to enforce otherwise valid noncompete provisions,
"the courts will now strain to put such a construction upon the covenant so as to save it in part."
Edwards v. Mullin, 220 Cal. 379,382 (1934).

16601. Id. at 566. The court of appeal, however, found that a contract with no geographical
limit will be enforced to the extent permitted by law. Because the heating business was located
in Los Angeles County, the court prohibited the seller from competing with the entire county.

In Mahlstedt, the California Courl of Appeal succinctly stated the rules regarding
enforcement of non-competition provisions made ancillary to the sale of a business:
On the date of the contract sections 1673 and 1674 of the Civil
Code were m effect (These provisions with slight modifications
are now sections 16600 and 16601 of the Business and Professions
Code.) As authorized by said sections of the Civil Code appellant,
having transferred the good will of his business, agreed to refrain
&om carrying on a similar business for a period of ten years. He
contends that that portion of his agreement was void because it did
not, as required by section 1674, specify the territory within which
he agreed not to carry on his business. I f such a contract is
indefinite as to time or t e r r i t o ~fhe court will constme it in such
manner as to make it valid. I f the contract is unrestricted as to
the territow in which the seller agreed to refrain from
competition with the uurchaser ofhis business, or i f it includes
more territorv than that provided bv Caw it will be construed to be
operative within the countv or portion thereof in which the
business is located (City Carpet etc. Works v. Jones, 102 Cal.
506,512 [36 P. 8411; Stephens v. Bean, 65 Cal. App. 779, 783
[224 P. 10221; General Paint Corp. v. Seymour, 124 Cal. App.
61 1,614 [12 P.2d 990]), and if the agreement is indeterminate as
to the period of its operation, or is without time limit, the court will
construe it to cover the time permitted by law. (Gregory v.
Spieker, 110 Cal. 150,153 [42 P. 576,52 Am.St.Rep. 701; Brown
v. Kling, 101 Cal. 295,298 [35 P. 9951.)
79 Cal. App. 2d at 566-67 (emphasis added); Kolani v. Glush, 64 Cal. App. 4th 402,407-08,75
Cal. Rptr. 2d 257,259-60 (Cal. App. 1998) (stating in dictum that several courts have "saved"
covenants not to compete which were valid under 5 16601, but simply overbroad in scope).

It is important to note that, in Strategix, the California Court of Appeal in no way
overruled the vast body of California law summarized above in Mahlstedt. Indeed, the Strategix
court cited Mahlstedt in recognizing that "Courts have 'blue penciled' non-competition
covenants with overbroad or omitted geographic and time restrictions to include reasonable
limitations." 142 Cal. App. 4th at 1074. Accordingly, the result in Strategix appears to be
limited to the specific facts presented in that case.
Against the clear weight of California law, even if the Non-Competition
Agreement encompasses a territory that cannot be protected from competition along with a
territory that can be protected, that does not mean, as Mori has argued, that the Non-Competition
Agreement is unenforceable. Instead, as demonstrated below, the Non-Competition Agreement
specifically captures territories where Leg-it conduced business prior to the merger in 1997.
Accordingly, at a minimum, the Non-Competition Agreement is operative in the areas in which
Leg-it conducted business.
Moreover, with regard to Mori's claim that the Non-Competition Agreement
cannot be enforced because TJT is trying to enforce the agreement ten years after Leg-it was
sold, there can be no doubt that the California courts have enforced non-competition provisions
with a term of ten years. Franz, 126 Cal. at 180; Mahlstedt, 79 Cal. App. 2d 562 at 566. Indeed,
in a case involving a non-competition provision of infinite duration, the California Supreme
Court tailored such provision to apply for as long as the purchaser carried on a similar business.
See Martinez v. Martinez, 41 Cal. 2d 704,706 (1953). In light of these authorities, TJT's efforts
to enforce the Non-Compete Agreement are not impacted by the passage of time. TJT paid

nearly a half-million dollars in consideration for the Non-Competition Agreement and such
agreement was not without value until Mori terminated his relationship with TJT.
Finally, as for Mori's intensely fact-driven argument that Leg-it has no more
goodwill to protect, such argument can be rejected based on the very authority upon which Mori
reIies in his opposition brief. Specifically, in Strategix, the Califomia Court of Appeal noted that
Section 16601 covenants "prevent the seller from unfairly depriving the buyer of the full value of
its acquisition, including its goodwill." 143 Cal. App. 4th at 1072 (emphasis added).6
Accordingly, the touchstone under Califomia law is preventing a seller from depriving the buyer
of the full value of its acquisition, which merely includes goodwill. Even if Leg-it has no more
goodwill to protect-a
judgment stage-the

contested factual issue that cannot be foreclosed at the sununw
absence of goodwill does not render the Non-Competition Agreement

unenforceable. By openly competing with TJT in areas where Leg-It previously did business in
violation of his Non-Competition Agreement, Mori is unquestionably depriving TJT of the full
value of the $1 million consideration that it paid as part of the Leg-it merger. As a result, the
Non-Competition Agreement must be enforced.
F.

In Seeking Attorney's Fees, Mori Cannot Simultaneously Invalidate and
Invoke the Provisions of the Non-Competition Agreement.
Mori relies on Califomia Civil Code Section 1717, which provides that

contractual prevailing party attorney fees provisions must be mutual, i.e., both sides must be able
"At comlnon law, a restraint against competition was valid to the extent it reasonably
provided protection for a valid interest of the party in whose favor the restraint ran." Vacco
Indus., Znc. v. Tony Van Den Berg, 5 Cal. App. 4th 34,47-48,6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 602 (1992).

to enforce such provisions. Mori claims that he is entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to Section
1717 even though he successfully convinced the district court that the Non-Competition
Agreement is void-and

therefore illegal-under

the prohibition against employer-employee

non-competes stated in California Business and Professions Code 16600. The authorities cited in
TJT's opening brief squarely state why Section 1717 has no application here. See Opening Brief
at 36-40, citing Geffen v. Moss, 53 Cal. App. 3d 215 (1975); Bovard v. Am. Horse Enters., Inc.,
201 Cal. App. 3d 832 (1988). Specifically, in Bovard, the court of appeal stated:
Ordinarily, in an action on a contract which provides for an award
of attorney's fees, the prevailing party in the action is entitled to
attorney's fees. (Civ. Code, $ 1717, subd. (a).) This is so even
when the party prevails on grounds the contract is inapplicable,
invalid, unenforceable or nonexistent, if the other party would have
been entitled to attorney's fees had it prevailed.

However, a different rule auulies where a contract is held
unenforceable because o f illesali~.Geffen v. Moss (1975) 53
Cal. App. 3d 215 is directly on point. In that case, the court held a
party may not recover attorney's fees when it successfully defends
an action on a contract on the ground the contract violated public
policy.

201 Cal. App. 3d at 842-43 (emphasis added). Because the district court held the NonCompetition Agreement to be illegal as a result of Mori's arguments, Mori cannot invoke
Section 1717.'

If there was any room for argument as to the impact of this Court's finding that the noncompetition agreement is void, that argument was recently unequivocally addressed in Edwards
v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 44 Cal. 4th 937,946,189 P.3d 285,289 (Cal. 2008), wherein the
California Supreme Court stated, "In sum, following the Legislature, this court generally
condemns noncompetition agreements . . . such restraints on trade are '-1.''
(Emphasis

For the same reasons, Mori's reliance on Yuba Cypress Hous. v. Area Developers,
98 Cal. App. 4th 1077 (2002), is misplaced. Mori devotes an entire section of his Respondent's
Brief to contend that the Non-Competition Agreement was tied to Mori's employment with TJT,
not the goodwill of Leg-it. See Respondent's Brief at 16-18. The point of this argument appears
to be that Mori wants to leave the Court with the impression that the Non-Competition
Agreement is nothing more than an illegal contract that bans the pursuit of a lawful profession,
trade, or business. At the same time, when it comes time to uphold the Non-Competition
Agreement for the sole purposes of extracting legal fees from TJT, Mori argues that the NonCompetition Agreement did have a lawfkl object insofar as it was made ancillary to the sale of a
business. Specifically, Mori argues that "the facts of this case are distinguishable from Bovard
and Geffen [because] Mori and TJT were not entering into a non-compete agreement whose very
object was illegal. The parties entered into the sale of a business and their object in creating a
sale of business non-compete was not illegal." See Respondent's Brief at 30. Mori's argument
contravenes the holding of the district court, which concluded that the term of the Non-

added.) And, despite Mori's plea to the contrary, it has long been the law in California that noncompetition agreements in violation of the provisions of Section 16600 are illegal. Thus, the
object of an agreement that violates Section 16600 is indeed an illegal object. Advanced Bionics
Coup. v. Medtronic, Inc., 29 Cal. 4th 697,706,59 P.3d 231,237 (Cal. 2002) ("We have even
called noncompetition agreements illegal"); Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Sews., Inc.,
24 Cal. 4th 83, 123, n.12,99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745,6 P.3d 669 (2000) (noting that contracts that
violate Section 16600 are "illegal"); Kolani v. Glusku, 64 Cal. App. 4th 402,407-08,75 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 257,259-60 (Cal. App. 1998) (contracts that violate Sections 16600 and 16601 are
"illegal"); Application Group, Inc. v. Hunter Group, Iitc., 61 Cal. App. 4th 881, 889,72 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 73,77-78 (Cal. App. 1998) (referencing trial court's finding that covenant that violated
Section 16600 was "illegal").

Competition Agreement was tied to Mori's employment and was therefore void pursuant to
Section 16600. ER 000233-000234 (1/31/08 Order). Embedded in this determination is the
district court's conclusion that the Non-competition Agreement was more akin to an
"employment" non-compete that was illegal under California Business and Professions Code
Section 16600, as opposed to a non-compete made ancillary to the sale of a business. Id. Mori's
arguments on appeal simply contradict the findings of the district court that the covenant at issue
is an illegal covenant prohibited by Section 16600.
G.

Idaho Law Does Not Govern the Award of Attorney's Fees.

The parties to the Non-Competition Agreement selected California law to govern
the agreement by use of the followi~lglanguage: "This Agreement shall be governed by,
construed, interpreted and applied in accordance with the laws of the State of California, without
giving effect to any conflict of laws rules that would refer the matter to the laws of another
jurisdiction." See EROOOl15 (Non-Competition Agreement 7 10(a)). The Idaho courts
recognize and enforce contractual choice of law provisions in both commercial and noncommercial settings. See Great Plains Equip., Inc. v. Nw.Pipeline Corp., 132 Idaho 754,765,
979 P.2d 627, 628 (1999). As a result of the broad reach of this provision, there is absolutely no
need or occasion to look to Idaho law in determining whether attorney's fees should be awarded.
When Mori and TJT executed the agreement, they unquestionably agreed that California law
would control all aspects of the Non-Competition Agreement. Against this background, the
district court incorrectly found that both California and Idaho law would allow for the recovery
of attorney's fees and therefore concluded that a choice of law analysis was not necessary. See

ER000272 (1 1/21/08 Order). As demonstrated above, under the rule stated in Bovard and
Geffea, California law does not permit an award of attorney's fees. In light of the choice of law
provision in the Non-Competition Agreement, the inquiry ends there.
Mori contends that, even though the parties selected California law to govern all
aspects of the Non-Competition Agreement, somehow Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) should
apply here. In order to prevail on this argument, Mori must establish that the parties to the NonCompetition Agreement intended to carve out a limited "attorney's fees exception" to the choice
of law provision (paragraph 1O(a)), which clearly identifies that that California law will govern.
At a minimum, the parties' intent to apply any other law than the state of California to all aspects
of the Non-Competition Agreement is a factual issue that should have been developed in the
district court. The same holds true for any choice of law analysis to be conducted in relation to
an award of attorney's fees.
Finally, Ward v. Puregro Co., 128 Idaho 366,913 P.2d 582 (1996), is
distinguishable hom the facts presented here. In Ward, there is no indication that a conflict
between Idaho and California law existed; as a result, the Idaho Supreme Court did not undertake
a choice of law analysis to determine if a conflict existed. Accordingly, the Idaho Supreme
Court's award of attorney's fees under Idaho law may not have offended or even conflicted with
the parties' inclusion of the California choice of law provision in their settlement agreement.
Thus, Ward bears little on the parties' dispute over attorney's fees in this case. Notwithstanding
the application of Idaho law in Ward, when presented with a binding choice of law provision
selecting a particular state's law to govern, courts look to the law of such state to govern all

aspects of the dispute, including the award of attorney's fees. See, e.g., Fiedler v. Bowler, 117
Or. App. 162, 166,843 P.2d 961,963-64 (Or. Ct. App. 1992) (enforcing parties' Indiana choice
of law provision and applying Indiana law to disallow an award of attorney's fees); Telco
Leasing, k c . v. Transwesterit Title Co., 630 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that district court
committed plain error because it applied California contract law on the issue of attorney's fees
despite the parties' explicit and valid contractual choice of law clause selecting Illinois law).

H.

The Record Does Not Indicate That the District Court Considered All
Factors Under Idaho Rule of CiviJ Procedure 54(e)(3) in Awarding
Attorney's Pees.
The attorney's fees awarded in this case exceed six figures. Mori makes several

references to the fact that the district court awarded "some" but not all of Mori's requested fees.
The Court should not be misled by Mori's statements, as Mori received all but $2,926.00 of the
total fees and costs he requested. See ER000268 (612108 Order). For all intents and purposes,
Mori received everything that he requested by way of attorney's fees and costs and cannot
credibly claim otherwise. To uphold the award of fees, Mori accurately cites this Court's
decision in Parsons v. Mutual of Enurnclaw Insurance Co., 143 Idaho 743 (2007), but misapplies
the holding of that case in relation to the facts presented here. In Parsons, this Court stated that
when a district court awards attorney's fees, the record must clearly indicate that the district
court considered all factors under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(3). Although TJT did
focus considerably on the unreasonable amount of time spent by Mori's attorneys in defense of
this case (including, for example, the expense of $11,450.00 to prepare Mori's answer to TJT's
complaint), that does not change the fact that the district court failed to consider all factors under

Rule 54(e)(3) prior to granting Mori's attorney's fees in excess of $100,000.00. The record
before this Court does not clearly show whether the district court considered all of the Rule
54(e)(3) factors and, therefore, the district court committed error.

111.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, TJT respectfully requests tbis Court to reverse the
district court's grant of s m a r y judgment to Mori, to grant partial s m a r y judgment in favor
of TJT, and to reverse the district court's award of attorney's fees to Mori.
DATED this 27th day of May, 2009.
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